

TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN PEACE ORDER (NEPO)?

For peace politics to happen there are at least three conditions that have to be fulfilled: there has to be a broad mass movement, there have to be political carriers, and there has to be a program. I would say that by and large the first two conditions are better met than ever since the Cold War started. The millions in the peace movement, not to mention the hundreds of millions who do not support the "deterrence" policy of the governments, and in Eastern Europe the countless study groups, camps, discussion groups and even demonstrations. Then, the peace parties/ecological/green parties that are beginning to get into parliament, and the parties already there, social democrat and liberal that are beginning to become peace parties. And, in Western Europe three NATO countries not following the line: Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece; and in Eastern Europe Rumania. The picture is different from what it was even only some years ago, although the position taken by Rumania and France is of older date. But, what about the program? What is happening in this field?

The concrete content of a New European Peace Order can be, and is being discussed, under two headings:

I. Alternative Alliance Systems

II. Alternative Defense Systems

They are, of course related to each other. For each of them a division of the range of possibilities into four alternatives may be useful.

Thus, there seem to be four positions on the alliance issue in the West, meaning on NATO:

Ia: Status quo, meaning a US-dominated NATO, today hardly a majority view in any NATO country because the US is seen as not only dominating, but also dangerous. To get a war out of the present situation one needs: an irreconcilable conflict philosophy; an arms race that goes on unabated [with helpless and probably useless disarmament talks]; confrontations around the world; and a military posture as if a first strike is being contemplated - with decapitating capability (7.500 Cruise/PershingII around the Soviet Union against 2.500 goals?); with effective anti-submarine warfare to eliminate the other side's second strike capability; with laser defense to eliminate surviving missiles; with civil defense to offer residual protection; with preparation of the population for sacrifice in case all of this proves insufficient. The US is seen, increasingly, as combining all these elements, the major reasons why people in Europe are afraid of a war coming from [Reagan] US, not so much from the Soviet Union. Washington has difficulties understanding this, the peace movement has yet to find a pedagogy.

Ib: US - Western Europe partnership, two pillars NATO. One basic problem with this concept is the uncertainty about the future role of France, seen by increasingly many as "napoleonic" in her ambitions, wanting a l'Europe de Paris. The five deployment countries constitute a forward Maginot line, a missile fence; the refusal of France to be counted in disarmament talks leaves her free to con-

tinue nuclear armament [eg by 7-mirving of the 18+80 missiles]; a Western European defense concept would be France-dominated through French continental nuclear monopoly, administered alone, jointly with Germany [in a minor role] or within a European Defense Community, based on the Western European Union, as a way of activating a two-speed European Community. None of these models is likely to reassure Moscow, who will hardly ever remove land-based middle-range missiles as long as France does not. Mitterand was wrong: France has missiles and [almost] no peace movement.

- Ic: An egalitarian NATO with a clearly defensive military doctrine, which is probably what the Western European people want even if their governments do not reflect it. NATO as a political association, most of the defense effort to be carried individually by the countries - with the transition possibility of leaving the military integrated command if a defensive, non-provocative strategy is not accepted in a first phase. NATO continues as a defense of political democracy; the WTO as a defense of an increasingly democratic socialism, with Finlandization of Eastern Europe as a possible goal.
- Id: Dissolution of the alliances, neutral status all over. This should be the clearly defined long-term goal; the problems right now being [a] there have to be steps in-between, [b] as a short term goal it is believed in by very few. About as many [2/3] believe in NATO as there are people against a key NATO decision, the missile deployment, the "double-track" decision which of course from the beginning was single-track [except to the very, very naive].

Then, there is the parallel discussion of the defense issue, also with four major positions:

- IIa: Status quo, meaning with the possibility of first use of weapons of mass destruction, more particularly of nuclear arms. This is the strategy people are dead against, and not only those who identify themselves with the peace movement but increasingly the majority of the population, important political parties, the governments of some countries. As a very minimum they would request freeze/zoning/no-first-use. The problem is what kind of alternative **defense system** they would envisage.
- IIb: Conventional, offensive arms. This is what many top military, including Rogers, the NATO commander are arguing in favor of. The highly offensive strategy Airland Battle [2000] is a good example, taking the battle in Eastern Europe [Germany] and not in Western Europe [Germany]. These are the improvements of the arms with which World War II was fought, as seen, for instance, in the Israeli attack on Lebanon/Beirut in 1982. Like all offensive arms they are provocative, lead to arms races, and in all probability to wars.
- IIc: Conventional, defensive arms - a new military doctrine. This doctrine would have as its assumption first of all a no-first-use pledge also from the West, then its translation into military posture through withdrawal of [at least] all nuclear arms not belonging to the country itself [Brezhnev proposal, then Bahr proposal]. Coordination East and West through talks/negotiations would be needed, but West would now have to take some first steps, because of nuclear superiority and because it is in general more likely that East will imitate West than vice versa, for historical reasons. Some conventional, highly defensive armament [meaning with short-range weapons systems that are very precise, with PGM - precision-guided munition], would be needed, aiming at small, highly mobile, locally based, autonomous units well dispersed on own territory so as to make the country as indigestible as possible. Para-military defense would also belong.

IIId: Nonmilitary, social defense. This defense would be based on a strategy of non-use of violence against persons, but possibly against objects that may be of use to an invader (sabotage). Noncooperation to make the social structure useless, civil disobedience as acts of utter defiance, but at the same time efforts to gain personal and positive relations to the invader/occupant as individuals. The problem with this position is that it may work better in some cultures/structures than others (thus, are Germans sufficiently talented in disobedience to do this); and that it is very much a minority position in the countries concerned.

Let us now try to combine these two efforts to outline major positions in the current struggle for a New European Peace Order. In principle there are sixteen combinations, and of ~~ten~~ four combinations that right now seem to cover the discussion space relatively well:

Ia + IIa: The conservative ["Blue"] option. Conservatives do what conservatives are supposed to do: they stick to status quo. No amount of superpower cruelty, interventionism, invasions, war-mongering, threats and provocations and armament impresses them negatively. Their support is unfailing. They do not discover how alone they are before it is too late.

Ib + IIb: The neo-conservative ["Light Blue"] option. This is the combination for the intelligent conservative who understands that something has to be done, and hopes that less reliance on nuclear and more on highly offensive conventional strategies/doctrines ("to increase the nuclear threshold") and a militarily strong and more independent will take the wind out of the sails of the peace movement. They are reflecting the debate within the self-appointed military-bureaucratic-corporate-intelligentsia-politician elite that is ruling our countries in these matters, not the debate in the population. But they are good at marketing their option as an alternative, riding on - among other factors - the lack of debate about French foreign policy, and about the crucial distinction (however problematic because of the grey zones) between offensive and defensive arms.

Ic + IIc,d: The social democratic/liberal ["Light red/Light green"] option. This is probably the position towards which the social democrats are steering, but it is a long process since many are still in the first option, and even more are tempted by the second. I think liberal groupings will tend in this direction, also with hesitation. Well prepared, well presented there is probably a population majority for this in many countries in Europe, probably most (with the clear exception of France). The defense strategy would have to be a MIX. For this to be "Vernunft in der Mitte" there has to be a more radical option:

Id + IID: The pacifist ["Green"] option. This is the long-term goal and should be stated as clearly as possible. However, the road to dissolution of alliance is probably through their transformation (Ic), and the road to disarmament probably through transarmament (IIc,d).

A possible process for transformation of the blocs has to be spelt out. For Europe the position taken above would imply the following:

- a general move towards defensive weapons, away from offensive arms
- more independent forms of defense
- transformation of alliances from military to political alliances, and as negotiation partners in transnational processes
- withdrawal of US and Soviet troops in Europe, starting with offensive weapons systems

However, no such position is meaningful unless there are changes inside the alliances and inside the countries:

For the countries in Eastern Europe:

- (a) armed neutrality, committed to resist attacks on themselves and on neighbors (including the Soviet Union) through their territory (Finnish model?)
- (b) trade and cooperation in all directions, but on equal terms, avoiding debt burdens and dependencies (Bulgarian model?)
- (c) production for social and human growth rather than capital growth (definition of socialism?)
- (d) democracy in the sense of having elections with real choices, if not multi-party, then multi-person (Hungarian model?)
- (e) continue the fight against Stalinism with its implications: interests of gross infractions of human rights, including the right to travel and return (Polish model?)

For the countries in Western Europe:

- (a) armed neutrality, committed to resist attacks on themselves and on neighbors (including the superpowers) through/over their territory. (Swedish model? - Swiss model?)
- (b) trade and cooperation in all directions, but on equal terms, avoiding debt burdens and dependencies (Austrian model?)
- (c) production for social and human growth rather than capital growth (compatible with social democracy?)
- (d) democracy developed further to include more than parliamentarism and parliament rule, more referenda, decentralization, federalization (Swiss model?)
- (e) fight against unemployment and the dangers imminent in a capitalist in crisis, more particularly fight against Reaganism with its implications in terms of gross infractions of human rights outside Western countries, in the Third world - through US politics, support to authoritarian dictatorships, etc.

And all of this in solidarity with the emancipation movements in the South - with hunger killing the equivalent of 275 Hiroshima bombs children annually. There is no law saying we have to continue forever being bossed and tossed around by superpowers intervening and invading, and being ruled by an invisible, technocratic, military group with militarized civilians on their side, meeting among themselves and usually not even being acknowledged in public debate, pushing (often panic laden) parliamentarians in front of them. (From SWP, USA, Perugia, Chering Speech 17-18 July 1984).